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Introduction
1 This paper looks at the infrastructure of a very specific –one may even call it exotic–
business of the early modern era that connected Northern and Southern Europe. The
ransoming  of  Northern  Europeans  enslaved  by  North  African  corsairs  may  be
considered as a rather odd business. Only a few thousand Northern Europeans were
ever taken by Muslim corsairs to Morocco,  Algiers,  Tunis or Tripoli,  and thus their
ransom was of little economic significance, the high prices and often bitter fortunes of
many individuals notwithstanding.1
2 However,  the ransoming business illustrates a structural  pattern of  trade that is  of
great historical importance. The organization of ransoming Northern Europeans was a
very complicated and highly precarious affair and was constantly threatened to fail by
the incalculable behavior of those engaged. How could it be otherwise? Mostly illiterate
sailors  from very  distant  parts  of  rural  and  underdeveloped  Northern  Germany  or
Scandinavia found themselves captured, often on ships with foreign flags,  and then
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abducted  to  poor  and  underdeveloped  North  African  countries  that  were  mostly
disconnected from world commerce and constantly at war with or embargoed by the
Iberian and Italian states. Northern European authorities with sufficient will power to
invest substantial time and money had to negotiate with Muslim authorities to ransom
the enslaved sailors and, in case of an accord, to enact a risky payment, since it was
always demanded in cash. This occurred in an age that had no means of long-distance
communication other than postal  letters  and traveling mediators.  However,  despite
these  problems,  ransoming  occurred,  starting  with  the  first  captures  of  Northern
Europeans,  and  their  ransom  rate  was  mostly  much  higher  than  that  of  Southern
Europeans.2 The North’s desire to have its sailors liberated ensured that substantial
resources were invested to attain that goal.
3 This  configuration  led  to  a  scenario  that  is  of  substantial  help  in  mapping  the
infrastructure of communication and commercial organization of the early modern era.
First, because of the difficulty of organizing ransoms, documentation has survived in
the archives providing information on nearly every problem that could arise. Second,
because of northerners’ desire to pay the least amount of transaction costs possible,
they  turned  to  the  best  organized  and  most  highly  developed  communication  and
commercial centers of the age. Surprisingly, in the eighteenth century for the Danish
monarchy this meant Venice, which emerges from the sources as an important node
for ransom affairs. The explanation of this preference over Livorno can help to explain
the still relevant position of Venice in the eighteenth-century commercial world.
4 The article is divided into two main parts: First, I provide a more global context, i.e. the
origins and structure of Northern European ransoming as it evolved in the seventeenth
century, when it was based in Livorno, and then how and when Venice began to play a
role herein at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In the second part I connect
these  observations  with  newer  research  on  Venice  as  a  mercantile  hub  in  the
eighteenth century, and I assess the effectiveness of ransoming via the lagoon-city.
 
Northern European ransoming via the Italian peninsula
5 Venice was affected by the upsurge of Muslim corsairing in the Mediterranean from the
1520s onwards. However, at a time when the newly-won Ottoman regencies of North
Africa were still subject to the authority of the Porte, Venice’s ships probably enjoyed
better treatment by corsair fleets.3 The problem thus remained limited for the powerful
republic, which in any case had the capability to arm convoys. It was no coincidence
that the first office for the redemption of slaves in the Italian peninsula was established
in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1548.4 After the watershed of Christian-Muslim
warfare in the Mediterranean of 1580, made famous by Braudel,  several parameters
changed fundamentally.5 The Porte lost much authority over the Barbary regencies,
and  the  war  of  the  fleets  was  replaced  by  a  “petite  guerre”  of  endless  corsairing,
primarily by Spaniards and Italians against North Africans and vice versa.6 In the last
decade of the sixteenth century Venice began to suffer more, and around the turn of
the century it had to make its ransoming business more professional.7
6 The Northern Europeans in the Mediterranean after 1590 were primarily Hanseatic,
Dutch and English. They did not suffer much from corsairs until 1610 since they were
often regarded as enemies of Spain. Yet, the capture of northerners rose constantly
thereafter, most likely due to the Dutch-Spanish truce of 1609 that ended the latent
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alliance  between the Dutch and the  North Africans,  reaching around 1,500 ships  in
1610–1650.8 Thus northerners soon had to begin ransoming. England and the Dutch
Republic opted for different models.9 The former sent squadrons to fight the corsairs
and after 1641 used state funds for most of its captives. The latter did not engage in
ransoming at  all,  leaving redemption to  the private  side.  Regardless  of  this  choice,
which affected the frequency of ransoming, the channels are not yet traceable in detail.
Both states primarily used their consuls in North Africa and, in times of war, resorted
to  merchants  (mostly  of  their  own  “nation”)  in  Livorno.10 From  the  surviving
fragmentary sources it seems Hanseatics mainly followed the same path. After having
tried ransoming via the French and Dutch consuls from 1610 onwards, a shift toward
Dutch merchants in Livorno began in Hamburg in June 1620. At the latest, in 1631 the
hitherto hesitant Lübeckers also made this switch.11
7 Venice  was  thus  left  aside.  In  the  early  seventeenth  century  Livorno  had  rapidly
become the new emporium for many entrepreneurial Northern European merchants,
who increased the intensity of northern business contacts.12 Venice certainly was home
to many German merchants, but most were from southern Germany and, around 1600,
they were still rather distinct from the Hanseatic-dominated German north. German
merchants in Venice had thus at best a very indirect connection to the problems of
slave  redemption.13 Livorno  was  the  main  center  for  organizing  and  enacting  the
ransom of northerners during the entire seventeenth century.
8 We know, however, that German and Jewish merchant communities in Venice were
engaged in ransoming activities that cannot be traced with much precision. In Venice
we know of a fund set up by Jews at the latest in 1609 that for some decades became a
central  element  of  ransoming  activities  for  and  by  Jews  everywhere  in  the
Mediterranean, be they captured by Christians or Muslims.14 For the Germans in Venice
we have no information other than these lines from a 1715 handwritten chronicle of
the nazione alemana:
And  in  the  year  1591,  which  followed  that  unprecedented  famine,  how  many
hungry were not satiated by the most pious Nazione? Many memorial-books which
still exist among the old scriptures (the ones that remained after the fire) testify
clearly  of  the  liberation  of  poor  captives  and  slaves  from  the  hands  of  the
Barbarians and of giving poor damsels pious alms.15
9 Unfortunately, this remains vague. Most likely, German merchants gave money to the
Provveditori  sopra  ospedali  e  luoghi  pii  e  riscatto  degli  schiavi,  the  office  charged  with
redemption of Venetian slaves.16
10 German  merchants  in  Venice  could  not  engage  in  any  trading  activities  in  the
Mediterranean and thus had no ships sailing to or from Venice. They had substantial
privileges in Venice, such as reduced tolls and the prohibition for Venetian merchants
to do business in Germany, but their restriction to overland trade to Germany meant
they were of best use to the Serenissima. Being thus intensely connected to southern
Germany in the years around 1600, German merchants in Venice seem to have been
only rarely in contact with the Hanseatic merchants who expanded their range in the
Mediterranean in these years, though these were mostly limited to Livorno and Genoa;
Venice was only sporadically touched by North Germans. With the strengthening of
Dutch trade in the Mediterranean after  1610,  the northern Germans also saw their
position in the west Italian port cities reduced and even more so in Venice.17 After 1621
the Venetians strengthened their trade with the Levant whilst at the same time the war
north of  the Alps  reduced traditional  trade with Germany.18 The Thirty Years’  War
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spared the most important Hanseatic cities enabling Hamburg and Lübeck to maintain
a  solid  position  in  the  western  Mediterranean  during  the  war.  Yet,  trade  between
northern Germany and Venice remained marginal, as did communication. In the years
around 1650 German merchants in Venice prohibited the admission of new merchants
to the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, the house of the German merchant community, who were
not approved by the nazione alemana.19 This measure was effectively directed against
Hanseatic merchants who from then on had practically no chance of admission to the
Fondaco and its privileges in Venice. Livorno and Genoa remained an important harbor
for the North Germans; Venice and Genoa for the South Germans.20
11 All ransoming activities thus were concentrated in Livorno, which had one profound
disadvantage.  Merchants in Livorno had a bad reputation for engaging too often in
risky businesses and operating on the threshold of bankruptcy. This is usually taken to
be a result of the Livornine of 1591 and 1593, the liberal legislation of the Medici.21 It
stipulated amongst other things that no one who settled in Livorno could be brought to
trial for past bankruptcies.22 This attracted a diverse range of merchants from all over
Europe, some of whom tried to escape their creditors or had a dubious past.23 Even solid
merchant houses were affected, since they had to engage in business with partners
there.  Trust,  thus,  was of  greater  importance here than elsewhere,  and we see the
demarcations of single “nations” of merchants being more pronounced and durable.24
Yet, after its declaration as a free port in the late sixteenth century, Livorno was until
1800 the place on the Italian peninsula with the best connections to Northern Europe
and the Muslim world.
12 We may give examples for the seventeenth century. Between 1624 and 1634 Hamburg
and  Lübeck  charged  the  firm  of  Bernard  van  den  Broecke  in  Livorno  with  their
ransoming business. Moreover, in February 1624, Hamburg signed a contract with a
professional  ransoming  expert,  Francis  van  Iperseel,  who  sailed  regularly  between
Livorno and Algiers. The enactment of the payments was intended to be done via the
merchant house of Broecke. Yet, in August 1627, Hamburg did not extend the contract
since  much  of  the  money  had  allegedly  sunk  with  two  ships  between  Algiers  and
Livorno.  Nobody  had  been  ransomed  and  the  senators  in  Hamburg  seem  to  have
suspected that Iperseel stole their money. Thereafter Hamburg continued to rely on
Broecke but had all its ransoming money insured against sinking or stealing at rates of
30 percent.25 Iperseel, however, continued with his business in the Mediterranean, of
which ransoming always formed an integral part. The last trace we have of him is a
three-page  memoir  from  23 March  1661  to  the  States  General.  Here  he  presented
himself as consul of Denmark and the Hanse at Algiers, a blatant lie since any remote
affiliation to these places had been severed decades ago.  He offered to ransom 384
Dutch slaves for 131,006 guilders, a comparatively small sum for so many slaves.26
13 Whatever the answer of the Dutch Republic in this specific case (most certainly it was
negative),  it  is  important  to  stress  that  men  of  dubious  standing  engaged  in  the
ransoming business and seem to have enriched themselves. The merchant houses of
Livorno also were problematic in this regard. Control was difficult so far away from the
northern world. Broecke went bankrupt in 1634, and it may be that money earmarked
for  redemption  got  lost.27 Even  though  this  is  not  synonymous  with  fraud,  the
ransoming institutions of Northern Europe still suffered in such cases. In 1650 Lübeck
wanted  to  install  a  proper  ransoming  agent  in  Algiers  to  reduce  dependency  on
Livorno, but this attempt failed.28 The Dutch and Hanseatics remained dependent on
Venice and the redemption of Northern European slaves (seventeenth and eighte...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 87 | 2013
4
their partners in Livorno for ransoming and had to face substantial extra payments
either  for  insurance  or  in  cases  of  fraud  or  bankruptcy.  It  seems  that  neither  the
Hanseatics nor the Dutch were satisfied with this strong dependency on Livorno. This
can be deduced from Hamburg’s reaction when a Dutch consul settled in Algiers in the
late  seventeenth  century.  In  1684  the  Dutch  Resident  in  Hamburg,  Gerard  Kuysten
(1647–1708), wrote to the Senate that the Dutch consul in Algiers, Christoffel Mathias
(1655–1702),29 was willing to ransom Lübeckers and Hamburgers who had served on
Dutch ships. This was certainly intended to strengthen the peace of the Dutch with
Algiers, which was constantly endangered by Dutch hesitation after having signed the
peace treaty to ransom the sailors of many nations who had been taken on their ships.
In Hamburg it was decided to use this channel to ransom all Hamburgers, not only the
ones  taken on  Dutch  ships.  Hamburg  sent  to  Mathias  the  substantial  sum of  6,800
Reichsthalers  for  the  ransom,  a  fact  that  hints  at  some  dissatisfaction  with  the
traditional contacts via Livorno.30
14 The  Danes  found  another  way  in  1715.  When  they  created  their  Sklavenkasse in
Copenhagen to ransom some one hundred Norwegian sailors captured by the Algerians
between 1706  and  1714,  they  approached  the  richest  German  merchant  house  in
Venice, the business of Johann Jacob Pommer (1659–1717).31 By then, contacts between
the  German  merchants  in  Venice  and  the  Danish  monarchy  were  already  well
established. King Frederick IV had nominated the German merchant Mathias Bachmair
in 1702 as Danish consul in Venice.32 The same king had visited Venice in the winter of
1708–1709.33 In 1710 Gabriel Soderini was sent from Venice to Copenhagen to negotiate
a business treaty between the Serenissima and the northern monarchy. Even though,
due to lack of interest by most merchants in Copenhagen, this did not result in a formal
treaty, –some entrepreneurs were already thinking of a stronger Danish– controlled
maritime intra-European trade independent of the still dominant Dutch.34
15 One of these presumably was Abraham Kløcker (1673–1730), one of the most visible and
active merchants from Copenhagen in the early eighteenth century.35 He most likely
had  business  contacts  with  Pommer,  who  in  around  1700  was  called  the  “greatest
banker of Venice.”36 From 1707 onwards Kløcker had been a member of the council of
Copenhagen as  a  merchant.  In the next  twenty-three years  he made an impressive
career, close to the court and government, which brought him such powerful positions
as  the  directorship  of  the  Danish  West  Indian  Company  and  into  the  Chamber  of
Commerce. 
16 Johann Jacob Pommer was the nephew of Johann Christoph Pommer (1626–1708) who
had moved from Vienna to Venice in 1645. There he acquired an impressive fortune
which brought him several prestigious positions in Venice (consul of Sweden, twice
consul of the nazione alemana). Johann Jacob had begun his training as a merchant in
the  house  of  his  uncle  in  1678  and  moved  afterwards  around  Europe  where  he
frequented and learned at the most important merchant houses of Germany, Holland,
England, Brabant, France and the Italian peninsula. When he came back to Venice in
the last decade of the seventeenth century, his uncle was so impressed by him that he
made him his associate and soon bequeathed his entire firm to him.37
17 Now the best connected merchant of Copenhagen and the best connected merchant of
Venice, both fluent in German, intensified their contact when faced with the need to
ransom on a large scale. When Kløcker was appointed as one of three directors of the
Danish Sklavenkasse in 1715, this new royal institution approached Pommer in Venice
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with the request to be the central figure for the ransoming of captured sailors from
Danish-Norwegian ships. In the first surviving letter of the Sklavenkasse to Pommer (20 
April 1715), the directors mention a letter written by Kløcker to Pommer on 16 April,
asking him to serve as agent of the Sklavenkasse. It seems unlikely that Pommer would
have been contacted had not some prior business partnership existed between the two.
38
18 Johann Jacob Pommer accepted the task.  After  his  death in 1717,  his  son Johannes
Pommer (1692–1753) took over and continued the business. For thirty years, from April
1715 until March 1745, these two Pommers did practically all the ransoming the Danish
Sklavenkasse needed. They ransomed around 180 slaves taken on fourteen ships of the
Danish monarchy (six from Slesvig-Holstein, eight from Norway, none from Denmark).
The Sklavenkasse paid 173,310 Reichsthalers for these ransoms. Probably more than 95 
percent  of  this  money was  directly  transferred to  the  Pommers  in  Venice  through
letters of exchange from business partners in Amsterdam, London and Hamburg; the
rest was used for other correspondence, payment of scribes and charges to partners in
the named commercial centers. The Pommers usually kept 1 percent as commission;
thus in nearly thirty years they earned a bit  more than 1,500 Reichsthalers.39 For a
merchant family like the Pommers, which operated with money-flows of thousands of
Reichsthalers, this business was thus rather a side affair. But not negligible was the
prestige  and  sympathy  they  acquired  in  Copenhagen,  the  center  of  a  powerful
composite monarchy. Even more, since the Sklavenkasse in Copenhagen had no direct
financial  connection to Venice and always ordered its  bills  of  exchange from other
firms in London, Amsterdam and Hamburg, this may have been an important step to
intensify the connection of the Pommers (and thereby Venice) with some of the most
important merchants and firms in Northern Europe. Among the flow of letters from the
Sklavenkasse to  the  Pommers  we  find  transactions  of  Danish  merchants  that  were
completely unconnected to the ransoming business, showing that ransoming en passant
helped create or increase connections between Northern and Southern Europe.
 
Venice as a mercantile and ransoming center in the
eighteenth century
19 Had the choice of  a  contact  in Venice been made because of  the little  expertise in
Denmark on Mediterranean affairs or, on the contrary, because of strong expertise?
The Hanseatics and the Dutch Republic never let merchants in Venice do any of their
ransoming; both always relied on their partners in Livorno. The choice of Livorno thus
reflects the basic tendency of the most innovative merchants to make use of the main
line of commercial interactions between northwestern Europe and Italy. Had Denmark,
as a country without knowledge of Mediterranean affairs, perhaps chosen a merchant
in Venice as partner due to its unfamiliarity with this trading area?
20 This may be the case; yet it also may have been a decision based on profound reflection.
Certainly Venice in the eighteenth century was no longer the strong commercial hub it
had been in the Middle Ages. This notwithstanding, nowadays we see much clearer just
how solid the position of Venice remained until the convulsions of the Napoleonic era.
One of the first historians to put this idea forward was Eugène Tarlé, in 1928.40 This has
found support among economic historians. While the American historian Richard Rapp
pointed out how well Venice maintained its economy during the seventeenth century,41
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more modern research has pointed out how many profitable and rich industries the
Republic was able to retain deep into the eighteenth century.42 This does not mean that
Venice in the eighteenth century has been completely misrepresented. There was a
commonly shared sentiment of crisis, especially in the second half of the century, at
least in the sphere of public finance.43 Starting in the 1780s, difficulties grew with the
increasing efficiency of Austrian mercantilist policy and competition from a strongly
subsidized Trieste.44
21 Even in the last decades of the republic, Venice benefited strongly from its political
stability  and  creditworthiness.  It  remained  an  important  center  of  information.45
German merchants were still attracted by important privileges, and the Fondaco dei
Tedeschi,  far  from being  an  outdated  and medieval  instrument,  was  obviously  still
alluring.46 It is surprising just how many German merchants remained active in Venice.
The  group in  the  eighteenth  century  for  the  first  time  even included  some native
Hamburgers.47 That they and the traditionally dominant southern Germans were now,
in contrast to the seventeenth century, well-connected to the pulse of world trade, was
pointed out by Jean Georgelin, who wrote after having compared tax registers on the
respective  merchant  groups  of  the  1770s  (mostly  Greeks,  Jews,  Venetians  and
Germans):
Les  négociants  de  la  Dominante  n’avaient  donc  rien  à  envier  à  leurs  collègues
étrangers. Et l’on est en droit de conclure à l’opulence de dizaines d’entre eux. Mais
les  Vénitiens  se  retrouvaient  minoritaires  […]  les  plus  puissants  des  Allemands,
Rech et Lamenit, s’assuraient des revenus supérieurs du double à ceux du plus riche
vénitien.48
22 German merchants in Venice were obviously a group to be reckoned with. They played
an important part in what Ludwig Beutin has called the “silent expansion” of German
trade in the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century.49 In this regard the economic
growth of the German world from the 1740s onwards may also have had a positive
effect on the German merchant community in Venice.50 Venice was the closest Italian
port to the German Empire and traditionally had been intimately connected to its fate.
23 These indications explain why the Danish crown chose a rich banker in Venice as its
main agent for ransoming. He could receive letters relatively quickly, he could forward
substantial sums of credit, he could do his business with few transaction costs due to
his standing among contemporaries and he knew with whom to do business in the
Italian peninsula. The Pommers commissioned business partners in Livorno with the
actual ransoming. Even though Tuscany and the Barbary regencies were officially at
war, an old agreement on safe passage between Algiers and Livorno ensured the safe
exchange of prisoners.51 This was practically the only way to actually get the prisoners
onto Christian ground. The alternative of Marseilles was rarely used, most likely due to
the  absence  of  a  strong  Jewish  community  there.52 This  brings  us  to  the  second
important  reason  that  made  Livorno  the  principal  hub  of  ransoming:  a  large  and
flourishing Jewish/Sephardic community lived there, and its merchants had the most
extensive and durable contact network with and into the Muslim world, where Jews
were among the most influential merchants.
24 Thus, the Danes in principle would not have needed Venice as a hub. And even once the
Danish monarchy did choose Venice, the real ransoming was conducted via Livorno.
Yet, far from being a superfluous detour for letters and money from Denmark to North
Africa, Venice was important as a contact point. From there, ransoming could then be
organized via Livorno. Merchants in Venice knew their business partners in Livorno
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much better than the merchants in Copenhagen did. It is likely that the Danes chose a
merchant family in Venice as their principal partners precisely because of the lack of
Danish  involvement  in  Mediterranean  trade  at  that  time.53 Yet,  the  choice  was  an
excellent one that fulfilled all self-set goals. The Danes chose a reliable channel in a city
that still was in many aspects a cornerstone of Mediterranean trade and commercial
flows.
25 By following step-by-step how the ransoming was actually organized, we can better
understand how the system worked. A difficult but still fairly typical case of ransoming
for the Sklavenkasse was the case of a ship from Flensburg under the command of Peter
Weinschenck that had been captured by the Algerians in 1721. On 14 November 1721
Johannes  Pommer  wrote  from Venice  to  inform the  board  of  the Sklavenkasse that
“Turkish” corsairs had taken thirteen ships from all nations and that among them was
a ship from Flensburg, called Emanuel, with a crew of sixteen sailors. He included a list
of  the  names  that  he  had  been  able  to  gather,  since  he  knew  he  would  soon  be
authorized to ransom them. The Sklavenkasse confirmed receipt of this letter on 10 
January  1722.54 That  year  the  institution  had  serious  financial  problems  and  many
captured sailors to buy back and thus was unable to give an immediate redemption
order.  On 24 January the Sklavenkasse wrote  to  the city  of  Flensburg and requested
alms-collections since its  funds were depleted.55 Flensburg started collecting money
and was able to send several thousand Reichsthalers in the following years. The money
was not sent to Copenhagen but to Hamburg. This was where the principal banker of
the Sklavenkasse, Adolf Sontum (d. 1732), was located since no direct financial transfers
between Copenhagen and Venice were possible. The payments were made in bills of
exchange and such remittances were possible only between Hamburg and Venice. The
Sklavenkasse also turned to other partners in Amsterdam (Treschow and Dreyer) and
London (John  Collet),  but  payments  through  them were  made  only  occasionally  in
order to benefit from better exchange rates.
26 On 21 February 1722 the Sklavenkasse sent  Pommer a list  of  the names provided by
Flensburg. The city also demanded more information on the prices demanded for the
individuals.56 Pommer forwarded this to his partner in Livorno, the Dutch merchant
Friedrich Brogh (d. 1732), who also acted as consul there.57 He, in turn, approached a
Jew named Solyman (d. 1723), who lived in Algiers. In 1718–1720 Solyman had been the
object of much distain from the Sklavenkasse, which did not want a Jew making profits
from a Christian affair.58 However,  finally it  had been forced to give in after Brogh
explicitly lauded Solyman’s conduct in ransoming the slaves.59
27 Solyman obtained the prices rather quickly, sent these to Brogh in Livorno, who then
forwarded  them  to  Pommer.  Pommer  wrote  on  3 July  1722  to  the  Sklavenkasse in
Copenhagen, and his letter was answered on 18 July. We do not know the prices, but the
correspondence indicates they were high. Even though the Sklavenkasse had issued a
moratorium on ransoming in  January 1722 to  force  the Algerians  to  reduce prices,
pressure from Flensburg, the most powerful city of the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein,
combined  with  the  substantial  sums  that  had  already  been  collected,  forced  the
Sklavenkasse into action. Thus, it ordered that the captain and three sailors be ransomed
for the lowest price possible. They were to be freed and sent to Livorno, where each
would get ten Reichsthalers to be able to go back home, most likely by land but, if
cheaply possible, also by sea.60 The payment was to be advanced via a letter of exchange
from Pommer to  Brogh,  who would  then send the  money in  specie  to  Solyman in
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Algiers and insure it.  On 11 December 1722 Pommer announced that three men had
been  freed,  including  the  captain.  The  Sklavenkasse answered  Pommer  on  4  March,
thanked him for the success,  ordered that  the fourth man be ransomed and added
another name. The latter had been expressly demanded by Flensburg. The Sklavenkasse
also expressed great worries about the fact  that the one sailor not yet freed was a
young  boy;  implicitly  this  meant  they  feared  he  might  be  converted  to  Islam  and
circumcised.61 On 10 September 1723 and 12 November Pommer wrote that he had been
able  to  free  the  newly  demanded  man,  but  not  the  young  boy.  The  Sklavenkasse
answered on 4 December 1723 and confirmed his attached invoice of his latest expenses
by giving order to Sontum in Hamburg to pay Pommer.62
28 Unfortunately we cannot provide details of every component of the final cost. The first
three ransomed men, among them the usually expensive captain, cost a total of 5,771 
Reichsthalers;  the  fourth  man  ransomed  in  1723,  an  ordinary  sailor,  cost  1,372 
Reichsthalers. This was extraordinarily high for a sailor, which can only be explained
by the explicit demand to ransom a precise individual. This put the Sklavenkasse in the
worst  possible  bargaining position.  We can suggest  some hypotheses  regarding the
single cost components. The dispatch of letters over long distances certainly entailed a
rather  negligible  cost.  The  involvement  of  Adolf  Sontum  in  Hamburg,  Johannes
Pommer in Venice, Friedrich Brogh in Livorno and Solyman in Algiers, however, was
costly. Yet, knowing that Pommer took a commission of just 1 percent for the letters of
exchange, we may suppose this was not too expensive. Even adding the costs of the
currency exchanges, these may also not amount to much. The insurance of the shipping
of money in specie from Livorno to Algiers and the passage back with the freed sailors
was certainly more expensive. The profit of Solyman in Algiers is unknown, yet this was
probably  quite  fair.  The  French and English  consuls  always  stood  ready  to  do  this
business and therefore he could not act like a monopolist. Also, all redeemed slaves
were questioned after their return about their liberator and the sums he had employed
to redeem them. Some control  was therefore possible from Copenhagen and it  was
exercised. From other cases we know that three-quarters or four-fifths of the end sum
were usually given to the slave masters in Algiers and the rest had to be used for the
additional costs.63 Given that this business occurred in the pre-modern world from one
periphery in the far European north to the other periphery at the southern end of the
Mediterranean, this charge seems rather modest. This may have been partly thanks to
the  use  of  Venice  as  the  transaction  location.  In  the  network  just  described,  the
Sklavenkasse never lost money via fraud or misappropriation.
29 The remaining crew of the Flensburg ship was entirely ransomed over the next years.
Two sailors were able to escape, but the money saved was offset by extremely high
prices  for  the  other  crew  members  (over  1,000 Reichsthalers  for  the  ship  boy  and
between 1,200 and 1,500 for most of the remaining sailors). Continuing money flows
from  Flensburg  as  well  as  the  influence  of  the  city  within  the  composite  Danish
monarchy forced the Sklavenkasse to prioritize the ransom of the Flensburgers, which
resulted in  high prices.  The last  Flensburgers  were  ransomed in  1726.  This  was  an
extraordinarily long time, but it was due only to the lack of financial means, not to an
inefficient system. In 1737–1738, the Sklavenkasse was able to ransom entire crews in
less than one year after the capture with exactly the same infrastructure.64 The choice
of a merchant house in Venice as the essential link to do the ransoming proved a very
Venice and the redemption of Northern European slaves (seventeenth and eighte...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 87 | 2013
9
good one and consistently helped the Danes in their task of liberating their sailors in
the first half of the eighteenth century.
 
Conclusion
30 This  paper  has  added  another  little  strand  to  the  broad  and  constantly  growing
revisionist  literature  that  differentiates,  elaborates  and  relativizes  the  image  of  a
decaying Venetian Republic in the eighteenth century. The city of Venice emerges as
home to well-connected and capital-endowed German merchants. One of these comes
to light with his activities in the ransoming of Northern European slaves, a rather small
affair in quantitative and monetary terms but highly visible due to the complexity of
the business. The traditional center of these activities was Livorno, a fact confirmed by
the way the German merchant in Venice acted when he got involved in the ransoming.
Venice was in this regard just a communication and financial link between Copenhagen
and Livorno.
31 But was this negligible? This can be doubted. The first half of this article highlighted
some problems with the direct ransoming of Northern Europeans via Livorno.65 This
probably  should  not  be  generalized.  Livorno  remained  the  emporium  of  the
Mediterranean,  and  no  Hamburger  or  Dutchman  who  ever  wished  to  do  some
ransoming  would  have  contemplated  replacing  it  with  Venice.  Since  from  1600 
onwards there had always been a direct connection between Hamburg and Amsterdam
and Livorno, the risk for the Dutch and Hanseatics probably was never too great. Yet,
for a country at the periphery like Denmark, solidity and accountability were of crucial
importance, given the lack of precise information about the Mediterranean. This the
Pommers of Venice were able to deliver. We know that the Sklavenkasse never lost any
money  due  to  insolvency  or  corruption  in  the  Italian  peninsula.  The  Pommers
obviously were able to keep an eye on their partners. Venice, at least with regard to
ransoming,  comes to the fore in the first  half  of  the eighteenth century as a place
where informed and reliable merchants operated and were able to provide complex
services for small charges. This can certainly be generalized on a larger scale. After
1746 Venice was no longer needed by the Danes, since peace treaties with the Barbary
powers  from  that  year  onwards  guaranteed  Danish  ships  safety  throughout  the
Mediterranean.  Yet,  when  the  need  for  ransoming  subsided,  trade  and  shipping
between Denmark and Venice increased constantly, to become rather substantial in the
second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century.66 In  this  connection,  the  German  merchant
houses of Venice were again to play a substantial role, thus continuing and enlarging a
connection, which groundwork had been laid in the first half of the century with the
business of ransoming.67
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RÉSUMÉS
Entre 1600 et 1750, et plus particulièrement entre 1610 et 1640, des navires de l’Europe du Nord
furent  capturés  par  les  corsaires  barbaresques.  C’était  la  conséquence  logique  de  l’arrivée
massive  à  partir  de  la  fin  du  xvie siècle  de  navires  et  marchands  de  l’Europe  du  Nord  en
Méditerranée et de l’expansion simultanée de la course nord-africaine en Atlantique. Les Nord-
Européens commencèrent à racheter leurs frères réduits en esclavage et, pour ce faire, ils eurent
recours  à  des  moyens  assez  complexes.  La  monarchie  danoise,  qui  pénètre  en  Méditerranée
relativement  tard,  commence  ses  rachats  seulement  à  partir  de  1700.  L’institution  danoise
préposée aux rachats,  la  Sklavenkasse,  s’appuie sur des contacts commerciaux à Venise pour
racheter ses captifs, ce qui en fait un cas singulier dans la mesure où la plupart des acteurs de
l’Europe du Nord organisaient alors les rachats en passant par Livourne. Cet article explore les
mécanismes de rachat des Danois et montre également l’importance et la capacité de Venise en
tant que centre commercial dans l’Europe du xviiie siècle.
The capture of Northern European ships by Barbary corsairs occurred mainly between 1600 and
1750, with most captures taking place between 1610 and 1640. This was a natural result of the
intense penetration of Southern European waters by Northern European ships and merchants
starting in the late  sixteenth century and the simultaneous extension of  the range of  North
African corsairs into the Atlantic. Northern Europeans began ransoming their brethren from the
first captures onwards and used quite complex means to achieve this aim. The Danish monarchy
was a latecomer to Southern European waters and therefore began ransoming only from 1700
onwards.  The  reliance  of  the  Danish  ransoming  institution,  the  Sklavenkasse,  on  business
contacts  in  Venice  to  do  the  buying-back  makes  this  a  unique  case;  most  other  Northern
European actors  organized  ransoming  via  Livorno.  In  this  paper,  the  mechanisms  of  Danish
ransoming  are  highlighted  in  order  to  show  the  importance  and  capacity  of  Venice  as  a
commercial center in eighteenth-century Europe.
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